Is the Emissions Glass Half Full or Half Empty? Storm Éowyn blew down over 50m trees in January 2025 that would otherwise be taking CO2 out of the atmosphere (Image: DAFM) By Emeritus Professor John Sweeney, Irish Climate Analysis and Research UnitS (ICARUS), Maynooth University In his Irish Times article article, 'Ireland's emissions remained almost within limit during first carbon budget' (March 19), Professor Brian O Gallachoir presented an upbeat review of Ireland’s performance in tackling its greenhouse gas emissions now that the first five year carbon budget period has ended. While he rightly acknowledges that final data for this period will not be available until this time next year, it is clear now that although the budget limit of 295 million tonnes (Mt) will be exceeded, the overshoot will be relatively small, of the order of 5-10Mt. This is a better outcome than expected a few short years ago. However, this should not be a cause for complacency, as several factors have conspired to make what was a relatively soft target more easily attainable, and these are not likely to be repeated as we enter Carbon Budget 2 (2026-2030) which has a much stricter budget limit of 200Mt, less any overshoot from 2021-25. 'Paper' Changes While it might be tempting to pat ourselves on the back and ascribe the near compliance to enlightened government policies, this would be mistaken. Certainly there have been some positive aspects to the latter. However, a series of methodological adjustments as to how emissions were counted by the EPA has been apparent throughout the period, particularly resulting in downward revisions to the baseline figure from which reductions are measured, and carried through on all subsequent years. The baseline emissions as measured in 2018 were 68.3Mt, but in the final submission made by the EPA last year this was retrospectively reduced to 64.5Mt. Such ‘paper’ changes provided Ireland’s most greenhouse gas polluting sector, agriculture, for example, with a ‘windfall’ reduction of 8Mt over the five year period, making what was already the lowest sectoral emission reduction requirement of 10% rather easier to comply with. 'Non-policy' benefits Other ‘non policy’ benefits arose in the case of energy emissions. Rather than interconnectors being two way devices to balance different peak hour demand for electricity between countries, they have become increasingly one way conduits to ‘offshore’ Ireland’s electricity generation. Ireland imported 14.0% of its electricity across international interconnectors in 2024, up from 9.5% in 2023, largely to feed the burgeoning demand for data centres. But these emissions were not counted in Ireland’s carbon budget. With increasing dependence on other countries for our electricity supply, energy security is being sacrificed at a time when international geopolitics should require the opposite. Had we the foresight demonstrated by many of our European partners, such as Spain and Portugal, to progress more rapidly the switch to renewable energy, and limit pumping fossil fuel subsidies to the tune of €4b per year, we would not be as vulnerable to the energy shocks currently being experienced. A further issue related to uncertainty in emissions due to Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). The latest estimates from the EPA for 2024 merely replicate the numbers from 2023. Of course, headline reports also tend to quote national emissions without the Land Use figures which are legally required to be counted under the Climate Change Act 2021. But the latter are very much going in the wrong direction, as Irish forests mature and afforestation rates fail to replace them. Currently these land use emissions are around 4Mt per annum and reaching the point at which our EU compliance will be problematic. In addition, Storm Éowyn blew down 50 million trees in January 2025 that would otherwise be taking CO2 out of the atmosphere. This was equivalent to 2-3 times the annual forest harvest. A realistic figure for what this means for LULUCF is essential to be included in the final greenhouse gas inventory figures. Hard data is lacking on land use changes, however. Despite promises at COP30 that publication would occur before last Christmas, the second phase of the Land Use Review, which would have thrown much light on LULUCF matters, and which has been finished for over a year, has been buried somewhere in government. No Climate Action Plan for 2026 has yet emerged either and sectoral emission ceilings which apply to 2026-30 remain incomplete. The bottom line is that while optimistic noises may be made about our progress in limiting emissions, the underlying problem is not being tackled by effective policy measures. While our annual emissions have declined by 13% since 2018, this is a long way from the 51% legally required to be achieved in five years’ time. Ireland’s imminent leadership role in climate diplomacy which commences with the Council Presidency in July is not something to be looked forward to with confidence based on our long term performance. While our EU partners have achieved average emission reductions of 40% since 1990, we have managed a measly 5%. Although some may see the glass half full, half empty may be a more realistic assessment at this time. Related: Irish Governments Ambition to Fail on Climate Action: By Terri Morrissey, Chair An Taisce Manage Cookie Preferences